Eurocrats to Kiev’s rescue. Prospects of French intervention in the Russia-Ukraine Conflict.

Author: Ioannis Andris

Faux Napoleon: From Grande Armée to Grand Farce

It will probably be recorded as a great accident of history that Emanuel Macron is not himself leading the French Army the way Napoleon Bonaparte did a couple of centuries ago. For had he been, there is a very good chance that history would have offered us a matchup reminiscent of Borodino, but this time somewhere along the vast Ukrainian step, perhaps also immortalized in some film, with Macron played by an AI-rejuvenated and thinned Gerard Depardieu and Shoigu by Steven Seagal. Then again, neither is Gerasimov a new Kutuzov, and Shoigu, who at least has the Kutuzovian physique sans the blind eye, would probably be hiding in a bunker practicing black Tuvan magic, should hostilities between the French Republic and the Russian Federation do indeed erupt over such trivial matters as Zelensky’s coke supply and who controls Europe. Strelkov on the other hand, who I wager would make a great Pyotr Bagration, having extensive martial and martial LARPing expertise, is locked up in a jail cell as punishment for questioning the czar’s handling of the (non)war, while the French army, that hasn’t distinguished itself since the days of… Austerlitz would probably have a difficult time producing a new Ney, “Brave des braves”, “the bravest of the brave”.

So dear reader, I fear there will be no immediate repetition of Borodino, but perhaps if we delve a little bit deeper into history, we might find the proper analogue. Say, Lake Peipus, the Battle of the Ice? After all, Kaja Kallas, the Prime Minster of Estonia, a statelet one would be hard pressed to distinguish from a speck of dust on the map, was adamant recently that we shouldn’t fear Russia’s nuclear weapons nor Putin’s warnings about their potential usage. But I do fear that the rather fragile and frail figure of Miss Kallas would be ill-suited to don a suit of knightly armor, similar to the one her Teutonic forefathers wore and died on, succumbing under Russian sword and arrow during the Battle of the Ice.

To be fair, and above all wishing not to be labeled as sexists, a peccatum originale in these days of woke/feminist supremacy, neither President Putin, who in more innocent days loved to show off his horsemanship skills, would play the part of Alexander Nevsky particularly well. Then again, there is the worn-out Marxian maxim that says that history repeats itself first as a farce and then as a tragedy, and I have a growing suspicion we will see it repeat itself as both a farce and a tragedy pretty soon.

Since we have established that none of our present-day heroes would look especially well in the elegant Napoleonic era uniforms, nor have the stamina for the medieval plate and chain mail-though perhaps Gerasimov once could, and gerontophilic Macron might just confuse the chains of the armor for some BDSM session paraphernalia and gladly wear it-are there any fitting historic analogues left?

(Un)fortunately there are no historical analogues for nuclear war, but the Macrons and Kallases increasingly seem to fit very well in their Hazmat anti-radiation suits. Can it indeed be that the Ukrainian war, a major regional conflict, soon morphs into a pan-European war, or even a global one? Has Macron lost it? Are we confidently and nonchalantly sleepwalking into nuclear Armageddon the same way pre-World War I leaders were walking into a bloodbath self-assured the other side would fold before real hostilities erupt? To these and other questions I attempt to answer in this brief article, in the perhaps familiar by now style of dividing the treatment of the subject to a geopolitical/international relations approach, and a more philosophical one.

To the bitter end. The Ukraine war is existential for all.

How did we go from Macron’s “Russia must not be humiliated in Ukraine”, to foreign legion regiments preparing to square it off with the VDV on the streets of Kharkov? Well, the answer is simultaneously quite simple and quite complicated. For the simple part we must remember that the first statement, that Russia must not be humiliated, was made at a period when Russia was appearing to lose the war, during the “good will gestures”, i.e. retreats from Kharkov and Kherson, but the second statement, the talk about French or broader NATO intervention in Ukraine, is being made at a period when it is Kiev’s forces that appear to be on the retreat. For the more complicated part, we need to try to gauge the current state of the war and tackle these questions-How close are the direct participants, Kiev and Moscow to achieving their goals? How close are Ukraine’s backers in the West in achieving theirs and how have all these goals changed as the conflict progressed?

Back then, a year and a half ago, it was conceivable that Kiev’s forces could, if not reverse Russia’s initial 2022 gains, at least sever the land bridge with Crimea and threaten to unravel the entire Russian war effort. The Russian army was suffering from crippling manpower shortages due to the initial force being itself much smaller than the one required for the task it was given. But in the span of about six months Russia successfully mobilized troops, initiated a mobilization of its economy, shifted its industrial base to a war economy, managed to repel the much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive leading to the destruction of a large portion of the western supplied weaponry and a PR disaster for Kiev.

In the meantime, Russians mounted their own offensives, about a year ago in Bakhmut, and more recently in Avdeevka, resulting in the capture of these two cities, which though limited in terms of territorial gains, can set the stage for a push to control the entire Donbass. And while the map hasn’t changed much, the decisive factor which is known only to the general staffs in Moscow and Kiev is the attrition rate of the two sides. Any talk of a stalemate, notwithstanding the static map, is indeed premature.

Now let’s examine the war aims of the various party involved. Kiev’s stated goal is to return to the 2014 status quo, reabsorbing Crimea and all the Russian-controlled areas to its sovereignty. All the other talk about putting Putin on trial at the Hague should not be taken seriously. Conceivably, the real war aims are less ambitious than the stated ones. And this holds true for all sides. Kiev would likely consider it a victory to return the map back to 2022 accompanied by security guarantees, either in the form of becoming part of NATO/Europe or by signing bilateral agreements with major western powers. All these goals, both the maximalist ones and the less ambitious ones, are in my view far beyond the reach of Kiev as the failed counteroffensive of 2023 and subsequent events demonstrated.

Moscow on the other hand appears equally unshakable in its statements that the initial goals of denazification and neutralization of the threat posed by Kiev can and will be achieved. Behind this denazification/neutralization rhetoric, it is clear, as one can also conclude from the initial push towards Kiev, was the intent of enforcing regime change, essentially reversing the Maidan coup-de-etat of 2014 via a coup-de-main. Given the current correlation of forces, without a new major mobilization, and substantial material support on the part of the West continuing, these goals appear equally unrealistic.

What about the war aims of the West? The West recognizes Russia as the only rival in the world stage capable of physically destroying it, owing to its nuclear weapons arsenal. Despite the significant losses incurred in personnel and equipment, the Russian conventional forces of today are a much more capable fighting force than they were in 2022, superior to any European state or coalition of European states. The threat posed to the West by China is more distant, both in terms of timelines and in terms of geography-at least as far as Europeans are concerned. So, the West would like to see Russia defeated in Ukraine, forced to retreat to the 2014 borders, accept that Kiev is part of the Western sphere of influence, and as an added bonus, possibly bring an end to the Putin era.

If the war in Ukraine continues along the current trends, without any side introducing a major qualitative and/or quantitative change, none of them will achieve their maximalist war aims, despite the current favorable trajectory for Russia. Instead, the Ukraine special operation, a de facto regime change operation, has evolved-or devolved if you like-into a war for the partition of Ukraine-which parts of it can Russia keep, and which parts can form a state integrated into the Western norms. The only tradeoffs available to each side have to do with giving away or gaining territory for accepting or rejecting security guarantees, as part of the eventual cease fire agreement.

A fundamental question since the beginning is whether this war is existential for the parties involved. First, we need a definition of what it means to be existential, which though it might sound clear cut, is far from it. Let’s use a metaphor, comparing a country at war with a person engaged in combat with various possible outcomes. The worst of course is physical annihilation, death. The best outcome is to remain unscathed and victorious. But in-between there are many variations ranging from a bloody nose, breaking one’s arm or leg, spending a few days in the hospital, to much worse, like losing a limb or losing a couple of limbs. Then again, one’s body might remain intact as a result of the fight, but paralyzed, crippled. Now, in all these cases, besides of course death, the existence of a person is not ended, though it might be significantly altered, transformed forever.

Similarly, to explore our metaphor, a country fighting a war is faced with various outcomes. It can escape from a war unscathed, or a bit bloodied, its territorial integrity not altered in any way, though perhaps having spent blood and treasure its existence changes in very profound ways. Such an example, one in which a nation emerged nominally victorious but underwent a dramatic transformation thereafter, is that of the United Kingdom after the Second World War. The United Kingdom survived and was victorious, but the British Empire did not. It had taken such a blow that it soon unraveled. A country can lose a limb or two so to speak, lose some of its provinces, its borders changed yet its existence continuing, its form of governance, its social structures intact. In such cases though, of borders being altered, it often means that the ruling elites of that country lose status and power, and a new internal political arrangement emerges after a defeat. In contrast, conflicts that end with the total annihilation of one of the combatants, reaching Punic Wars levels of destruction, are extremely rare.

We see that there are various layers and nuances when we try to tackle whether a conflict is existential or not. It might not be existential for a country, but it might be existential for that country’s elites. And we need to bear in mind that there are wars that might end with no significant change in borders yet can lead to the unraveling of an entire historical order. The war in Ukraine has the potential to do exactly that.

With this admittedly quite imperfect metaphor in mind, let’s examine where the main players of the Ukrainian conflict stand, regarding the existential nature or not of the fight for them, starting with Ukraine itself. Is it in danger of being razed to the ground by the evil™ Moskali horde? Its fertile fields strewn with salt and its wells poisoned? Are the Mykolas and Tetianas in danger of being sold as slaves in some cruel bazaar in the depths of Asia? That is, the Mykolas and Tetianas not already prostituting themselves in whatever way possible as beggars to their western masters. Unfortunately, I am not George W. Bush to gaze into the soul and mind of Putin, but I deem I am somewhat able to gauge his initial intentions regarding Ukraine, based on how he executed his February 2022 plan.

Putin went in with an army barely capable of holding a country one third that of Ukraine in terms of area and population. There was no major attempt to destroy critical infrastructure or command and control nodes. A move was made towards the capital Kiev, but it remained incomplete. In short, the main purpose appears to have been regime change, upending the political status quo established after the Maidan coup-de-etat and installing a pro-Russian government but retaining a nominal sovereignty and the status of a country distinct from Russia.

And while the initial Russian war aims might have not been truly existential for Ukraine, they certainly were existential for the Ukrainian political, military, and economic elites, the ones running the show (and Ukraine is a big sick show in many ways) since 2014. Given that these elites are the only ones perceived as legitimate by Ukraine’s western patrons, it is natural that they also identify the continuation of their rule as the continuation of Ukraine itself, thus existential. But what about the renewed Russian war aims after the initial Crimea redux failed attempt? Public statements from Russian officials claim that their starting goals have not changed, but that is unlikely, and now Russia’s principal goal appears to be the neutralization of the Ukrainian threat by making the country unviable, through partition and a systematic destruction of its ability to wage war. In terms of our metaphor, losing limbs and getting paralyzed.

Viewing things from Russia's perspective, one could argue that Ukraine, not just the territories controlled by Russia, but the entirety of the country, is but a small and insignificant fraction of the total area of Russia, the biggest country in the world. But that would be a very deceptive outlook on the situation. Russians rightly view large parts of Ukraine as historically Russian land, and a large part of these populated not by just pro Russians, but ethnic Russians, while control of Crimea ensures Russian presence in the Black Sea, a strategic objective. A defeat that would result in the loss of these territories, and the inability to liberate even more than those controlled now, would constitute a failure of all the efforts that Russia has made since 2014. While it would not lead to the destruction of Russia itself, it would mean an end to Russia's attempt to reassert itself in the global stage, and its overarching objective to usher in a multipolar world, hastening the end of Western hegemony. For Putin, who has basically staked his entire legacy upon success in Ukraine, defeat could mean an end of his reign-or worse as the failed Prigozhin mutiny demonstrated. Given these stakes, the war in Ukraine is existential for Russia and for its political class as well.

What about the US and Europe? Ukraine clearly lies far away from the continental United States. U.S. citizens cannot be kinetically affected by the war unless things really get hot, like nuclear mushroom cloud hot. In contrast to the US citizens though, Europeans can be directly affected by the war, and should Russian forces reach Lvov-or its radioactive remains-one day, this could indeed pose an imminent problem for European security. But the main issue for the Americans and Europeans should Kiev’s forces face defeat, are the profound ramifications such an outcome would mean for the post-Cold War global order, an order that has proven extremely beneficial for them.

Having vested so much both rhetorically and practically, and after such a massive influx of arms in Ukraine and having repeatedly called for a Ukrainian victory as the only acceptable outcome, a Russian victory, or in fact any other outcome, will result in a grave loss of status for the West. Such a loss of status can hasten or trigger western global decline. Behind all the self-righteousness and the nauseating platitudes about the sanctity of international recognized borders; behind all the crocodile tears about perceived war crimes and the hypocritical nonsense of preserving (a nonexistent) democracy in Ukraine, lies the very real fear of exposing the limits of the post-Cold War western imperium, an imperium that views itself as a global hegemon. It's the law of the jungle out there, and when the king shows signs of weakness, it's open season.

Should Russia win in Ukraine the era of US hegemony and its European pillar, the European Union can become unraveled. Often the most important things in human affairs are immaterial and symbolic. So is the western interest in the Ukraine war, but it is also unfortunately existential, largely by choice. It is therefore no accident that such a bloody conflict, one pregnant with the unspeakable evils of a global nuclear war, has raged for so long. All parties involved have existential stakes in it. It is almost a zero-sum game. Adding to that all the blood and treasure spent so far that feeds the sunk-cost fallacy principal, it is understandable why no one is willing to back down and everyone seems ready to fight to the bitter end.

Utopian Technocrats turned into Zealot Gardeners

Common folk are often under the erroneous impression that those that rule them are always in it just for power and money. That might often be the case, but those rulers, be they elected or unelected, that are of historical significance and stature, are mainly driven by the burning desire to shape the world around them and the fate of their respective nations according to their will. Sometimes they are a perfect match of Mephistophelian ambition, uncanny skill, and an unyielding will, like Napoleon Bonaparte, Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar. Much more common though amongst leaders is an abundance of ambition combined with mediocre skills and a weak will.

The worst kind though is born when that abundance of ambition and lack of other redemptionary attributes is coupled with a utopian vision of the world and a revanchist agenda. This is the archetype of the bureaucrat-revolutionary. The current breed of European leaders, the Eurocrats, the Macrons and the Von Der Leyens, the Borrells et al, are a perfect example of such utopians, men and women of significant ambition, otherwise unenviable skills, a genuine belief in their messianic vision of the European Union, and a zealot-like revanchism against Russia.

Whom do utopian authoritarians like the ones running the EU fear and hate the most? The ones that while aware and familiar with the utopian project, still choose to reject it and chart their own path. They are reviled for two reasons-refusing to see the “truth” and threatening to undermine it by sowing doubt and dissent, simply by virtue of their choice. It is not hard to see that Russia is in that sense the perfect outsider vis-à-vis the West in general, and the European Union in particular. Russia still clings to its “Old Gods”, conservative values like a traditional concept of man, woman and family, an independent foreign policy and not one subject to Washington’s whims like the slavish Europeans, and to top it all, the patriarchal figure of an absolute ruler reigning supreme. In short, Russia is the embodiment of anti-Progress, at least as Progress is perceived in the post-modern liberal western paradigm. Russia doth protest and object all it wants. This perspective is set in stone, and the Ukraine war only reinforced it.

How did Borrell refer to the European project? He called it “the Garden” in juxtaposition to “the jungle” outside. His precise words were: "Europe is a garden. We have built a garden. Everything works. It is the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that the humankind has been able to build – the three things together… The rest of the world is not exactly a garden. Most of the rest of the world is a jungle, and the jungle could invade the garden." In the Eurocrats eyes, their noble creation is the zenith of human achievement and must be defended at all costs from the “barbarians” outside the gates. In our case, the barbarians being the Russians, encroaching from the East. Russia with its more than a thousand-year-old history, its rich culture directly shaped by European influences, is for European elites part of “the jungle”. It is no accident that the Ukrainian cringeworthy and nauseating rhetoric about “Russian Orcs”, bloodthirsty bandits from the unforgiving toiletless steppe, and ruthless raiders of washing machines, resonates so harmoniously with the eurocrats’ grotesque view of the world. Their hatred for Russia and Russians is genuine, it’s not performative politics, but it is often in contrast with the view of at least large parts of the European public.

After Brexit made evident the brittleness and precarious position of the EU project, instead of changing course, the Eurocrats doubled down on these policies. And when Covid struck, no matter what one thinks about the danger it presented, it offered a great opportunity to consolidate power at the highest levels in Brussels and push for policies of centralized control few deemed possible even weeks before. It was a real boon for the Eurocrats. Russia’s adventures in Ukraine are similarly viewed as a danger and an opportunity by them. An opportunity to further stifle internal European dissent, and unify their project under a common foreign policy, an ever-fleeting goal till now.

There is also an interesting interplay at work here. A large part of the denizens of the garden, Europeans of various nationalities, are-to put it mildly-not buying into the utopian Borelian garden rhetoric. In fact, they seem quite fed up with the liberal totalitarian turn of centralized EU politics and the way Brussels seeks to control every aspect of their lives, pushing an overbearing, woke-fueled set of policies that more resembles a dystopia. These people are identified as populists, stuck in the past and an internal threat to the Garden. In Clintonian terms, they are the deplorables of the EU. Often depicted as pro-Russian, irreconcilable admirers of Putinesque machismo, they have all the names under the sun thrown at them, with recent trends suggesting a growing dangerous push to deprive them of a political voice, with calls to ban entire popular parties like the AfD in Germany. By being tough and uncompromising against Russia, Eurocrats believe that they can weaken the ideological link between local dissenters and outside “barbarians”. A Russian defeat would lay bare to the Europeans who are not in line with Brussels policies that there is no meaningful salvation from the Garden and in Borg collective terms “resistance is futile”.

There is another more sinister reason on why Russia is reviled by the European elites, one that is historically present and persistent for centuries. Russians, in contrast to the various people the European powers colonized over the years, are “like us”. Largely white Caucasians and Christians - albeit Orthodox - with many similar cultural traits and achievements paralleling the central European ones in fields like literature, music, and the sciences. And yet they stubbornly refuse to “see the light”. Thus, they must be chastised and made to accept the truth-Russia must be reformed.

Behind this self-righteous grandstanding rhetoric that wears the innocuous guise of good will, lies a hatred-and behind that hatred a deep-seated fear. It is the fear of every zealot that his message is hollow and untrue. Russia, a victorious and successful Russia trampling the western wunderwaffen, brushing off the Ukrainian western sponsored terror and rising triumphant, will be a pole of discontent for all dissenters, a mirror upon which the lies and failures of the European project will be reflected and revealed to the Garden’s residents. The winner enjoys not only the spoils but the admiration of the crowd-“if Russia won, it did something right and its system is superior to ours” will be the thoughts of the onlookers further to the East. This is a mortal, an existential danger for the European Utopian Technocrats that having turned into Zealot Gardeners seek to keep-or eradicate-the jungle outside.

Let’s go back to that living affront to Bonaparte, Macron and his words. The gerontophile of the Palais de l'Élysée said that Russia is “extending every day their threat of attacking us even more, and that we will have to live up to history and the courage that it requires”. Macron and the rest of the Eurocrats unconsciously understand, they feel it deep in their bones despite their hollier-than-thou attitude, that they are not historically relevant characters but mere supporting actors, and their erstwhile Empires has-been relics of history subjugated to Washington. Opposite them sits Putin. While I must say I find the Kremlin’s ruler uncharismatic, and I believe his overcautiousness has inhibited Russia from easy victories in the past, there is not a sliver of doubt that he is a man of tremendous historical gravitas, and the Eurocrat rubble, even put together, don’t hold a candle against him in that respect. Involving their armies in the Ukrainian battlefield would be the ultimate ego-boost and coping mechanism for the European political dwarves and military worms; their.. redemption arc. Not only will they try to prove-to themselves foremost-that they and their European Garden is historically relevant, but in the face of US isolationist tendencies they might even gain a modicum of independence from their masters beyond the Atlantic.

Still, there is some reason to hope that a direct Russia-NATO showdown will be avoided. Even as US and EU leaders bluster and threaten, behind their rhetoric they signal red lines. Macron alluded to a Russian push towards Kiev and Odessa as potential triggers for entering the war, meaning eastern Ukraine is fair game, and Loyd Austin, the US secretary of defense recently said that “The US will not let Ukraine fail”, which is not exactly the same as the earlier uncompromising pledges of Kiev winning. There seems to be simultaneously an understanding in Washington and Brussels that a Ukrainian victory without risking World War 3 is a very dubious prospect, and an ambivalent if not panicked rhetoric emanating from that realization. When Banderite lines break and the Russian army marches westwards, be sure that all these questions and assumptions will be put to the test.

References

https://www.prlib.ru/en/history/619144

https://news.err.ee/1609284987/kallas-to-bbc-putin-afraid-of-war-with-nato

https://twitter.com/RWApodcast/status/1771206072415502500

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sunk_cost

https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/10/19/josep-borrell-apologises-for-controversial-garden-vs-jungle-metaphor-but-stands-his-ground

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ban-afd-or-fight-it-germany-grapples-over-how-counter-far-right-2024-01-31/

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/frances-macron-urges-allies-not-be-coward-ukraine-2024-03-05/

https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/25/world/war-in-the-gulf-europe-gulf-fighting-shatters-europeans-fragile-unity.html

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/03/09/macron-an-advance-of-the-front-towards-odessa-or-kyiv-could-trigger-an-intervention-by-france/

https://www.voanews.com/a/austin-united-states-will-not-let-ukraine-fail/7533740.html